måndag, juni 11, 2007

USA överdriver Irans roll i det irakiska motståndet


USA överdriver Irans inblanding i det irakiska motståndet, skriver tankesmedjan British American Security Information Council. Här är deras slutsatser:

"It is difficult to prove that Iran is directly connected to the continuing violence in Iraq. Direct confrontation with US and other foreign troops, and increasing instability in the country more generally, are unlikely to further Iranian interests. Rather, Iran’s interest lies in supporting and training allies to influence their political positioning in a post-war, post-occupation Iraq.67 Whilst Tehran does not wish to see Iraq become a US client state, a failed state next door would be of no benefit either, and could become a severe and direct security threat.

If the Iraqi civil war were to get out of hand, Iran might feel obliged to help its Shia co-religionists more pro-actively against Sunni death squads,68 risking a spiralling involvement in the Iraqi conflict. Long-term, a failed state would have unpredictable consequences and would impact on economic relations with a major trading partner. For these reasons, although official Iranian
policy opposes the US presence in Iraq, suggestions of a relatively fast US withdrawal are prompting a degree of unease in Tehran.69

However, although spiralling Iraqi violence poses considerable risk to Iran, this
cannot be taken to mean that Tehran is not supporting such activity across the
border. Many western intelligence and Middle East experts believe that Tehran is
pursuing a policy of ‘managed chaos’ in Iraq. According to such thinking, US plans for the country are disrupted without a state of complete lawlessness emerging, creating political space for Iran to seek to shape a new Iraqi government.70 Tehran may also be supporting militia activity in order to align itself with the likely power-holders in a future Iraq. In May 2007 a British adviser to the local police force in Basra described most of the force as being under the control of different factions and militias, including Moqtada al-Sadr’s forces, and the Badr Brigade.71 Here, opportunism may play a role; Iran finds the nationalist rhetoric of Moqtada al-Sadr problematic, but the maintenance of ties with the popular and high profile Mahdi Army leader may prove beneficial. Indeed, backing being given by Tehran to the Mahdi Army and the Badr Corps may be intended as much to build and maintain relations as to support violent activity.

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